The Lunar Atmosphere and D Explorer (LADEE) spacecraft was launched 2013 UTC, and completed its mission on Ap with a directed impact to the Lunar Surface. were to examine the lunar atmosphere, mea and to demonstrate high rate laser comm LADEE mission was a resounding succe mission objectives, much of which can be attr planning and preparation. This paper discu preparations for fault conditions that could highly-critical phase of the mission, the Luna (LOI).
INTRODUCTION
The Lunar Atmosphere and Dust Enviro (LADEE) mission objectives were to exam and composition of the tenuous atmosphe and to understand its dust distribution. carrying payload instruments to achieve the LADEE provided a platform for a technolog of two-way laser-based communication distance. [ The GNC system determined sp inputs from a Star Tracker (STA), an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU Sun Sensors (CSS). It commanded rotation rates, using four Reaction small Reaction Control System (R thrusters had control valves and l commanded via a Valve Driver Un velocity for large maneuvers was Control System (OCS), a large, positioned carefully so that the th towards the center of mass. and Control (GNC) s control modes (such as ng Mode) to orient the unications, and science. pacecraft attitude using four MEMS rate gyros, U), and/or twelve Coarse d spacecraft attitude and n Wheels (RW) and four RCS) thrusters. The RCS latch valves which were nit (VDU). The change in provided by the Orbital , single, fixed thruster rust vector was directed
mponents and Payloads
Launched on September 7, 2013 UTC, LADEE completed a series of phasing loops and entered lunar orbit on October 6, 2013 UTC with the first of three Lunar Orbit Insertion (LOI) maneuvers. [3] The first LOI maneuver (LOI-1) was essential in order to be captured by the moon's gravity. Delaying this maneuver would have required extra propellant to achieve lunar orbit, therefore leaving less fuel to support science operations. Table 1 shows the impact to the mission for a delayed start of burn. A delay of more than 20 minutes would have made the mission unviable. The standard onboard automated fault management system that was used throughout the mission would have placed the spacecraft in a state that would have delayed or prevented the burn. Therefore most of the automated fault management responses were disabled during this critical period. Because the automated responses were disabled, the LADEE team needed to be fully prepared to execute LOI-1 even in the face of potential spacecraft faults. Therefore an analysis was conducted for the various types of contingencies that could occur, including component failures, inadvertent change to safe mode, inadvertent reboot, software failures, interrupted communications, and premature termination of the thruster burn.
For each likely contingency, the team readied detailed response procedures and command products that could be quickly executed if needed. This was followed by careful planning of the operations staffing, as well as rigorous testing of both the nominal and contingency scenarios. [7] Ultimately, the LOI-1 maneuver was executed without incident. But this level of careful preparation was essential in ensuring the mission could succeed had a contingency arisen. This paper describes the analysis, design, and preparation for the LADEE LOI-1 contingencies, and offers some high level recommendations about the process.
ONBOARD FAULT MANAGEMENT DESIGN
LADEE's Project philosophy dictated an acceptance of risk of a single-string spacecraft, while also allowing the development of capabilities to leverage certain functional redundancies. This drove the fault management design such that simple onboard logic encoded in the flight software would place the spacecraft in a power positive and thermally safe mode, and rely on ground operators for detailed fault assessment and recovery response. However, for critical operations, such as LOI, this automatic transition into safe mode was avoided because the spacecraft would not have been in the desired configuration. In these situations, fault management was placed in a "report only" mode, relying on operators to react to failures occurring, rather than respond to spacecraft safing.
LADEE leveraged Government Off the Shelf (GOTS) software called the Core Flight System (CFS) developed by Goddard Space Flight Center. [6] The ability to use simple logic, which could be disabled, drove the project to use the CFS Limit Checker (LC) application. LC works by setting a threshold on a specific telemetry packet, termed the Watchpoint Table. As seen in Figure 2 , Watchpoints, or simple threshold comparisons, are logically combined in the Actionpoint Table, to describe which actions are performed. This autonomous response sequence is stored in sets of Relative Time Sequences (RTS) and executed when the Actionpoint is evaluated as true. For critical operations, the Actionpoints were configured to be in the Passive state, causing an event to be displayed on the Operator's console instead of executing the RTS.
Figure 2 -Limit Checker Operation
The simple logic and execution frequency of the Limit Checker Application was not sufficient to protect against short time-to-criticality events. Therefore, LADEE also employed a set of safing actions within Flight Software. Specifically, the Fault Management design needed to protect against events such as CPU over usage, non-responding tasks, as well as the unlikely, yet possible, thruster leak.
Software failures were managed through the CFS module called Health and Safety (HS) which serviced a watchdog timer and provided a configurable response to nonresponding tasks. The second column of Table 2 shows the configuration of the HS The second column of Table 2 shows the configuration of the HS table for the LOI maneuver. These modifications to the HS response represent a more benign response. However, in the case of the State Estimator task, the response changed from an event message to a processor reboot. The maneuver could not occur with an Estimator task restart because the spacecraft would not have enough knowledge of its attitude and thus would not guarantee a successful burn.
As shown in Table 3 , fault management responses which were encoded within other FSW applications outside of the cFE layer, needed to be modified for LOI and other critical operations. These were modified in order to prevent a false positive error from triggering a fault management response.
DESIGN OF LOI CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
The first part of the process for designing the contingency operations was to determine what spacecraft hardware was essential to the maneuver. This Minimum Equipment List (MEL) allowed the team to focus on what could go wrong with each device, and to look closely at what type of Failure Impact Workaround (FIW) might be used to mitigate the fault. The primary equipment identified in the MEL included the Reaction Wheels, Inertial Measurement Unit, Star Tracker, Latch Valves, RCS thrusters, OCS thruster, and Avionics/Software. Although it was highly desirable to maintain Spacecraft to Ground communications throughout the maneuver, it was not necessary for the actual burn to succeed because the entire maneuver was driven by onboard scripts. The categorizations grouped similar types of fault responses. These were useful in that they could be handled using similar methods and command products, and therefore could be represented as contingency branches within Real Time Operations (RTO) Procedures. Each of these categories is discussed in more detail in the sections that follow. The cells in the table that are not shaded correspond to contingency responses that were disqualified, either because they were infeasible, or because they were a lower priority.
Normal Safe Mode Recoveries
These fault responses corresponded to the same type of response that might be initiated at any other time during the mission. In general, the approach was to analyze the event log and housekeeping data to determine why safe mode occurred, and then to initiate a set of actions (not necessarily pre-planned) to correct or bypass the situation. After these actions were taken, the spacecraft would have been manually commanded out of safe mode and returned to normal operation.
Troubleshooting after Fault Management Reconfiguration
The Fault Management reconfiguration prevented entering safe mode when a fault occurred. Any problems that occurred after reconfiguration would need to be corrected while in the spacecraft's Fine Pointing mode. Normal troubleshooting steps could take place, as long as they did not interfere with or jeopardize the burn. For instance, if the VDU was not responding, then a power cycle of the VDU could have been executed since it was not actively used during this period.
Comm Issue Recoveries
In general, this type of recovery may have required troubleshooting the ground data systems, the network, and the ground station to re-establish communication. Troubles at the ground station may have been alleviated by switching to a backup station. If none of these were successful, a command could have been sent in the blind to try and power cycle the transmitter. This was disallowed after AOS to reduce the risk of interrupting the burn.
Reboot Recovery
Prior to Fault Management Reconfiguration, the Reboot Recovery would have been treated similarly to a Safe Mode recovery. After Fault Management reconfiguration, there still existed a possibility that a fault could occur which would trigger an automated response to reboot the processor, such as the expiration of the watchdog timer.
The approach to a reboot was to modify the onboard default RTS that executed immediately after bootup. Its normal operation was to put the Limit Checker in an active state, which would detect the state of the spacecraft, power on devices, and cause the system to go into Safe Mode. Normally, Safe Mode would have been desirable after a reboot to keep the spacecraft thermally safe and power positive. But for LOI-1, it would have altered the spacecraft attitude away from the burn attitude, and hence prevented the burn.
For LOI-1, the default RTS was modified to eliminate enabling the Limit Checker. Instead, it executed additional RTSs that powered on the devices, and then immediately executed commands to set up for the burn -including the command to orient to the burn attitude. Once in view, a manual command could have been sent from the ground to execute the burn.
Specialized Hardware Failure Recoveries after AOS
There were a number of hardware faults for which there were specialized responses that could either correct or circumvent the problem. After AOS there was little time to diagnose and correct a problem before the burn occurred. Therefore, detection and diagnosis of these problems corresponded to monitoring very specific telemetry points for a particular signature. If one of these problems was identified, then a pre-defined onboard RTS would have been executed to try to correct the problem.
Restart Burn Recovery
If the burn should have started but for some reason failed to execute, then every minute that passed by before reattempting the burn would have increased the amount of propellant usage to achieve capture. Therefore, the burn signature was monitored very closely to ensure that the burn was actually taking place. If the burn signature was not observed, or if the signature indicated that the burn stopped prematurely, then action would be needed to restart the burn. Fortunately there were 5 clear telemetry signals that could be monitored to detect the burn. Given the severe consequence of stopping a good burn based on bad sensor data, at least 4 of the 5 signatures were required to indicate an error before action was to be taken.
The failures that would have prevented or stopped the burn itself were a very short list. Therefore, all of the actions to correct all of these failures would have been executed without needing to conduct a diagnosis on which occurred:
1. Something went wrong in the sequence -Stop the sequence.
2. The VDU Circuit Breaker tripped -Reset the breaker.
3. The VDU had an Internal Fault -Power cycle the VDU.
4. The OCS coil is bad -Switch to the Redundant Coil.
The Fire Command was not received -Run the Burn sequence again
Based on this list of scenarios, the detection and resulting actions could have occurred within a few minutes, and thus salvaged the mission. If the burn already started, and the telemetry signatures showed that the burn stopped, the same actions could be taken to restart the burn.
CONTINGENCY PROCEDURES PREPARATION
Based on the contingency operations design, procedures were developed to cover the fault categories described. The timeline for when contingency procedures were in effect is shown in Figure 3 . Note that there were some modifications that were implemented after the initial design. For instance, the Special Hardware Recoveries procedure went into effect prior to going out of view since time would have been short to do standard troubleshooting. Also, an additional contingency category was added called State Estimator Recovery. During operations, it was noted that in certain circumstances, a bright object in the field of view of the star tracker could cause the estimator to diverge resulting in an unknown spacecraft attitude. If this situation was detected, the estimator would need to be re-initialized to correct the problem.
To ensure the success of the fault management reconfiguration and contingency preparations the following precautions were taken: -All of the preparation and reconfiguration was implemented via reviewed, tested, and approved scripts so that it was executed exactly as it was practiced each time.
-LOI-1 preparations were conducted well in advance of the maneuver to ensure there was plenty of time to get it accomplished, even in the face of unforeseen difficulties.
Many of the contingency responses were to be executed via RTS so that they could be executed quickly via a single ground command. These specialized RTSs were uploaded and enabled during the preparation phase.
Figure 3 -Timeline for Contingency Procedures
To prepare for the reboot contingency, a special boot image was created that included all of the contingency RTSs, modified tables, and modified default RTS. After the burn, the fault management was reverted to its normal configuration, and the boot image pointer was set to the default boot load.
Note that the creation of an alternate boot image for LOI was viewed as a lower risk approach than modifying the default boot image. The likelihood of a reboot occurring was relatively low for the short period of time leading up to LOI-1. However, if a mistake was somehow made in the configuration of the default image, then over the longer term a reboot would be more likely, and a corrupted default image could result in severe consequences. Therefore, it was less risky for the overall mission to create an alternate boot image, and discard it after LOI. The alternate boot image was created in flight by copying the object files, RTSs, and tables from the spacecraft's memory, replacing the files needed to support the reboot contingency, and then installing these into the new boot partition. The process was done in flight to ensure that the alternate image would contain all of the latest files in use onboard the spacecraft.
[8]
MISSION OPERATIONS STAFFING
The on-console mission operations team was expanded to support LOI execution. For a non-maneuver day, real-time mission support staffing was limited to three console positions -the Flight Director, a Systems Engineer, and a Command Controller. For typical non-critical maneuvers, this staffing expanded to include the Mission Operations Manager (MOM), a Data Engineer, a trajectory analyst, and a supporting Spacecraft Engineering Team (SET). The SET included separate support engineers for each spacecraft subsystem -Avionics, Communications, Electrical, GNC, Propulsion, and Thermal. For LOI, this maneuver team expanded to include a second System Engineer and a Mission Planner. The role of this second Systems Engineer was to monitor for fault conditions identified in the procedures, and to make recommendations to the Flight Director whether to execute one of the contingency procedures. The role of the Mission Planner was to provide assistance in recommending or building command products if required.
In addition to mission operations console staffing, Project Management and Safety & Mission Assurance representatives were present for all maneuvers, including LOI. More details about LADEE's operations and staffing approach can be found in [5] .
TESTING AND TRAINING
All aspects of LOI planning, preparation and execution were practiced before launch; some portions of this sequence were also rehearsed during flight days prior to LOI execution. These practice sessions took three formsmission simulations, Operational Readiness Tests (ORTs) and rehearsals -and demonstrated abilities to respond to both spacecraft and ground system anomalies during LOI operations. Prior to each of these practice activities, the Mission Operations team would hold pre-briefs to review procedure steps and discuss contingency scenarios.
Mission simulations provided the first integrated simulation environment in which to exercise all aspects of a mission activity. Where previous "thread tests" involved only one or two operations personnel and exercised individual tools or products, simulations generally involved the entire operations team, all operations tools and all products required to perform an integrated activity such as a maneuver. As a first step in testing and practicing an activity, simulations often identified problems such as errors in procedures, flaws or weaknesses in tools, and areas in which personnel required further training.
In general, simulations focused on nominal operations rather than response to failures. For LOI, however, mission simulations included practice of contingency responses as outlined in LOI-specific flight procedures. These included major spacecraft anomalies, such as spacecraft reboot and temporary loss of propulsion system control, and ground system anomalies including loss of Deep Space Network ground station functions and failover of Mission Operations Center data systems.
After mission simulations were completed, ORTs served as formal tests to validate the approaches developed and refined through those mission simulations. ORTs were executed to be as flight-like as possible, even executing simulated activities at the same time of day as planned during the mission. The LOI ORT lasted 4 days, encompassing not only fault management reconfiguration and maneuver execution, but also the post-maneuver process of orbit determination and planning for the next maneuver. All ORTs addressed contingency scenarios; the LOI ORT included response to temporary loss of Star Tracker function, transient memory errors in LADEE's flight computer, and failures in the Mission Operations Center data system. Rehearsals provided a final opportunity -in the final weeks prior to launch -to practice procedure execution, timing, and team coordination for key events including launch and activation, phasing maneuvers and LOI. A two day LOI rehearsal allowed practice of the sequence of preparation, execution and recovery. A final rehearsal was performed post-launch, approximately two weeks prior to LOI-1 execution. This rehearsal exercised the nominal operations plan for thermal conditioning and maneuver execution only. No malfunctions were simulated as a part of this rehearsal.
More details about the LADEE testing process can be found in [4] .
OUTCOME AND CONCLUSION
Fortunately, the LOI-1 maneuver succeeded without any issues, and the contingency procedures were not utilized. However, the team was well prepared to have handled any of these situations. This was accomplished through a thorough development and preparation process addressing the onboard fault management system configuration, contingency procedures, command products, staffing levels, and training.
Based on the LADEE team's experiences with this preparation, the following high level recommendations are offered to other missions facing similar circumstances: f. Ensure the staffing is well trained through repeated testing of both the nominal and contingency situations.
2. We recommend that missions develop the Minimum Equipment List and Failure Impact Workaround study as early as possible and in conjunction with the development of the fault management plan. Early development allows trades to be made in how fault mitigation is handled, either through hardware, software, or operations. When making changes to the system design, these studies should be revisited and impacts assessed.
3. Practicing both nominal and contingency scenarios by the operations and engineering staff was invaluable for familiarizing the team with the processes, products, and procedures. In addition it was a useful means for getting feedback and honing these items. Therefore it is desirable to do this testing as early as possible, including as much of the engineering and operations staff as practical. 
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